A train operator at the helm during a deadly collision in California last month sent 29 text messages while on the job that day — including one just 22 seconds before the crash, the National Transportation Safety Board announced Wednesday. Cell phone records examined by the safety board indicate that Metrolink train engineer Robert Sanchez was sending text messages on both his morning and evening shift the day of the accident.
The Sept. 12 crash killed 25 commuters in California and left many other people injured when the train collided head-on with a Union Pacific train. Sanchez was killed in the crash,
The morning of the collision, the operator sent 24 messages and received 21 in just over two hours, records now reveal. Back at work later that day, Sanchez received seven more text messages and sent five more, including one less than 25 seconds before the crash, the NTSB found. In hopes of preventing similar accidents, California passed an emergency temporary order the week after the crash to bar train operators from using cell phones. The NTSB also hopes to implement a “positive train control” system that would monitor trains’ locations and speeds and stop them from colliding if engineers miss signals or if other mistakes transpire.
The number of lives changed because of this stupidity is staggering.
It seems to me that saying “texting was the problem” is a little shortsighted. There are computer systems that can prevent such accidents, but they haven’t been implemented. Or, a law could be passed outlining how freight and commuter systems share railways.
Hopefully what will come out of this is a more long term solution, but I’m not holding my breath.
I don’t mean to defend the conductor who was distracted, but I’m not convinced that texting was the cause of this accident. Sure, he sent a text 20 seconds before the trains collided, but even had he not been texting, you can’t stop a train in 20 seconds. Furthermore, why was there another train on his tracks to begin with? Aren’t there traffic controllers or something similar to stop this very sort of thing? What’s the best the conductor could have done, had he been attentive and watching? By the time he saw the other train coming for him, it would have already been too late to stop the collision. What’s he supposed to do? Swerve to avoid the collision?
This whole thing smells to me. It seems like someone is trying to pass the blame by blaming the dead conductor.
As a railroad worker there is more to this then just texting… In all likely hood the engineer was probably half asleep…. there have been times where we work 10 hrs all night long then spend 6 hours at the hotel… just to give you all an idea of what a typical day is ….. Bed at 11 pm Monday night up Tuesday morning at 7am to get kids off to school then maybe 1 hour nap in the day called at 9 pm Tuesday to go to work at 11pm ( we get a two hour call to go to work ) work all night till say till 9 am wed 1 hr ride to the hotel so in the hotel around 10-10:30 am get a call at 3pm ( total 6 hours off duty to be back in at 8 hrs )back at 5 pm to get another train going back home then on duty from 5 pm till 5 am wed back home at 6 am then 10 -12 hours off to be back at work again around 7 pm Wednesday night…. A say sleep at the throttle had a lot to do with it not just cell phone how many people you see driving while talking and texting on the phone? remember we don’t have to steer
This makes me angry, and not primarily at the train operator. Whoever set up this system where so many lives depended on the vigilance of one individual should be held accountable. A person or oversight board is 100% responsible here and should have to pay for such negligence. Dumb as the poor driver was, anything could have happened. He could have sneezed and missed the signal. This can’t be hard technology.
In 2008 I think it is a reasonable expectation of every passenger, that two such vehicles, thousand of pounds of steel, etc, should NEVER be allowed to be on the same tracks headed towards each other without huge alarms and flares and lights and finally automatic brakes. Were are the computers, transponders, GPS, radar? Apparently my garage door has more safety features than a commuter train full of hundreds of people.
#4 Kelly said, “He could have sneezed and missed the signal. This can’t be hard technology. ”
Except that he missed all 3 red light signals and was awake and texting during ALL of them.
I would have thought that train control had been solved fifty years ago. After all, it’s rather a one-dimensional problem. Points on a line.
And it only gets worse when you leave the ground. Now the problem is volumetric.
If Second Life can show me all the people in my local area, why can’t an airline pilot see a display of all the traffic in the plane’s local area?
Think Google Earth meets Nintendo.
You could create a tracking system that digested radar and gps data from everything local and build a Second Flight display that unambiguously showed everything at a glance. Predictive intrusions, path crossings, altitude violations, safe zones, estimates of time and speed—all could be combined into graphics anybody would “get” with minimum effort.
See this mustachioed plumber? That’s your airplane. See the bubble around him? That’s his safety zone. See these turtles? Those are the other airplanes. See this red lightning bolt? That’s an airplane getting too close. See this golden sparkle? That’s where you turn to avoid the big bad lightning bolt. etc.
Humans are limited, barely capable of driving cars without killing 45 thousand humans a year in the US. We need every kind of People Helper that can be dreamed up.
#6 “You could create a tracking system that digested radar and gps data from everything local and build a Second Flight display that unambiguously showed everything at a glance. Predictive intrusions, path crossings, altitude violations, safe zones, estimates of time and speed—all could be combined into graphics anybody would “get” with minimum effort.”
Sounds like the system used by the military.
Okay, here goes. Passenger and freight trains share tracks all over the country and the world. They do it safely 99.9999999% of the time. Unless you have the billions and billions to spend for separate right of way, don’t go there. The only reason that this particular stretch of track goes from double to single just past Chatsworth is that it then goes through the Santa Suzanna Pass which includes 3 tunnels, one of which is about a mile long. Not much chance to double track there!
Yes, there are systems that can be put into place that would automatically stop trains in such situations. But they are expensive and must be installed not only on tracks, but on every locomotive that might use the tracks. Consider that from the 1950s to about 10 years ago, the railroads have been in about the same financial shape as Fanny Mae and Freddie Mac. They only began to earn the cost of capital again very recently.
I won’t rant on texting, other than to question why anyone over the age of 17 and past the need to be “kewl” would want to. The fact is that the engineer, Mr. Sanchez, was involved in the volume of text communications while at the helm of a locomotive is pretty much proof that he was negligent. I will agree that railroaders suffer some of the worst working conditions in terms of hours of service vs. rest of any industry except perhaps medical interns. That has to and in fact IS changing. Slowly, but remember, we are dealing with a 175 year old industry, entrenched unions, federal regulations, and on and on.
Trains on this line, and many (most?) around the world must stop at red lights just like cars. They even get advance warnings that a red light will be coming up ahead. Sanchez got that. He was too sleepy/busy texting/doing god knows what to notice the red signal. A bus driver running a red light and careening into a semi might result in similar carnage. Sad, unfortunate, and mostly, but not entirely avoidable.
Now, if you add up the risk of dying in a train crash verses an automobile crash, based on say 25 years of daily commuting, you will find that you are far, far safer on the train, even if, when accidents happen, they are spectacular and tragic. The same goes for the airlines.
His last text message was: “WTF?”
If the NTSB doesn’t blame it on the operator then Metrolink would probrably get hammered by lawsuits. It’s a lot cheaper to payoff some inspectors. Smells worse than road kill in august!
I’m thinking fatigue was at least partly to blame here. He was working a split shift and supposedly took a nap between them, but there is no way to know if he was able to sleep during that period. If he failed to get any sleep, he would have been seriously fatigued. He will probably get the blame, otherwise management would have to share in the responsibility.
If you remember the 3 Mile Island Nuclear accident, one thing that never made it into the final report was that some of those men had been working 7-day shifts. I don’t care how competent you are. If you are not properly rested, you can have your ability to reason and make proper decisions fall to the level of being seriously drunk.
The one piece of this that is troubling is that the black box indicated that the Metrolink train NEVER applied its brakes. Even at the moment of the accedent, brakes weren’t applied. Assuming the box worked properly, this, to me, means that the engineer was either grossly negligent (not actually watching out the cab window) or was in some way impared.
The NTSB has not yet finished their investigation. The last update on the NTSB web site indicates they are still working on getting a precise time line.
Clearly a system needs to be installed. It doesn’t need to be GPS high tech even. The signal tab system they use on the London Underground is simple and could have prevented this tragedy. The way it works is that there is a tab (solid piece of metal) raised adjacent to the track when a signal goes red. There is a similar tab on the train at the correct position and height. If an engineer fails to stop at the red signal, the two tabs meet and the train automatically applies emergency braking. To make it goof proof, the system must be reset from the outside of the locomotive.
We will see if this accident is the one where they finally install the proper safety systems.
I’m not holding my breath.
Chris